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married woman, the wife of another man living at the time. If the
marriage is not proved both of the man and woman, although the
act be ever so clearly proved or confessed, it is but fornication whatever circumstances may attend it, founded only on the condition the
man may occupy, and whether married or otherwise.
There is also some difference of opinion, or confusion in expressing
it, how far a grand jury must be satisfied by the evidence, in order
to find a bill; some holding that it is sufficient if twelve or more of
the jury believe there is a sufficient amount of evidence to put the
defendant upon trial; in other words, that there is a probability that
the crime was committed; others maintaining that the grand jury
should be convinced to the same extent that would justify the petit
jury in returning a verdict of guilty. Twelve or more of the jury
should be satisfied by the proof that the defendant was guilty of the
offence charged, not however beyond a reasonable doubt-the weighing of doubts belongs to the traverse jury alone-after all evidence
on both sides is heard. The mode of proof before a jury also may
be different. It is not expected that they should discuss nice points
of the legality of the testimony, and may, as we think, find a bill on
evidence which might not be admissible before a traverse jury at all;
for example, reputation and co-habitation might be sufficient proof of
a marriage with a grand jury in cases where that medium of proof
would be rejected on the trial.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

In the Supreme Court of Olo-Januarl Term, 1855.
THE

11LAN AND RICHLAND PLANK ROAD COMPANY VS. EDWARD E.
RUSTED, TREASURER

OF HURON COUNTY.

1. That the legislature of Ohio has no constitutional authority, when conferring
special privileges on a corporation, to abridge or relinquish to any extzent, or in
any manner whatsoever, by contract or otherwise, any portion of the power of taxatioa over its corporate property, has been settled by solemn adjudication, and is
not now an open question in this State.
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2. The ninth section of the charter of this corporation, which specially provides,
that, in consideration of the expenditures which the company will necessarily
have to incur in making and keeping up its plank road, the property of the corporation of every kind shall beforever ezemptfrom taxation,must be construed with
reference to the constitutional powers of the legislature, and as operative only to
exempt the company from taxation under the authority of any law existing at
the time the act of incorporation was passed, but as wholly inoperative as against
any subsequent law imposing a tax upon the company.
3. A law being an imperative rule of action prescribed by the supreme power of the
government from the paramount considerations of the public interests, cannot in
its nature, be a contract, inasmuch as it is of the essence of a contract, that it be
an agreement between two competent parties upon a mutual consideration, and
in relation to a matter which is the legitimate subject matter of bargain or sale.
4. There is a plain distinction between a law authorizing a contract to be made and
a contract made under its authority. And where a contract is made pursuant
to the authority or direction of a statute, for the transfer of property or the performance of services, a vested right may be created, and where this is the case,
the repeal or amendment of the law would leave the obligations of the contract
still existing and unimpaired.
5. The legislative or law making power comprehends full control over existing laws
by amendment or repeal, as well as the power of enacting now laws.
6. This high trust of civil authority must, under the constitution of this state, continue in full force, and complete in its operation, at every session of the legislature, and the general assembly cannot, by contract or otherwise, at one session
impose any restraint, limitation or abridgment on the exercise of the legislative
power at any subsequent session; nor can this body, in the enactment of a law,
provide by contract or otherwise against its amendment or repeal at a subsequent
session.

This is a petition in error to reverse the judgment of the Common
Pleas of Huron county. The plaintiff in error having refused to
pay the taxes assessed upon the property of the corporation, for
state and county purposes for the year 1852, Edward E. Husted, as
the treasurer of Huron county, instituted proceedings in the Court
of Common Pleas, by scirefacias,pursuant to a statute of this State,
in order to enforce the collection of the taxes so assessed. To this
proceeding, the plaintiff in error plead specially, that, by virtue of the
act of the general assembly of the state of Ohio, incorporating the
company, it was expressly provided and agreed, that, in consideration of the construction of its plank road by the company, no assess-
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ment or tax should ever be levied or collected against said company,
and that the company, having organized and constructed its plank
road under this law, was exempt from the assessment of the tax
sought to be enforced, &c. To this plea a demurrer was interposed.
The Court of Common Pleas sustained the demurrer, and rendered
judgment against the corporation for the amount of the taxes,
together with the interest and penalty thereon, which judgment the
plaintiff in error now seeks to reverse.
It appears that, the Milan and Richland Plank Road Company was
duly incorporated by a statute, passed by the legislature of this
State, February 19, 1845. Ohio Laws, vol. 43, 111. The act of
incorporation confers the usual privileges exercised by corporations
of this description, authorizes the company to enter upon and take
and use the necessary land, materials, &c., for the purposes of its
road, and to erect toll gates on the road when completed, and to
exact the payment of such an amount of toll, by persons using the
road, as the directors may in their discretion prescribe. And the
9th section of the act of incorporation, is in the words following,
to wit:
"1That in consideration of the expenses which said company will necessarily incur
in constructing said road, with the appurtenances thereof, and in keeping the same
in repairs, the said road and its appurtenances, together with all tolls and profits
arising therefrom, are hereby vested in said corporation, and the same shall be forever exempt from any tax, imposition or asssessment whatever."

The law under which the taxes in question were assessed on the
property of the plaintiff in error, was enacted May 2, 1852, and requires the property of all persons, including corporations, in this
State, to be taxed equally, and at its actual value in money.
J.B. Osborn and E. B. Sadler, Attorneys for plaintiff.
A. S. Curtis, Attorney for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-The plaintiff in error claims an absolute and perpetual exemption from taxation, upon the alleged ground, that the
law incorporating the company is a contract between the State and
the corporation, containing a stipulation in express terms, that the
BARTLEY,
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corporation should be foreoer exempt from taxation. This was the
defence relied upon as a bar to the action in the court below, and
upon the ground that it was overruled by the court, the plaintiff in
error seeks to reverse the judgment. The question presented by
the case is twofold in its character, involving the question whether
the act incorporating the company is exempt from the legislative
power of amendment, and the corporation exempt from the legislative control over the right of taxation. Inasmuch as the charter
provides, in express terms, for a perpetual exemption from taxation,
the corporation can be made liable to taxation only by legislation
having the effect to amend the law creating it, by repealing the exemption.
The legislative or law-making power of the government necessarily comprehends the power of amending and repealing existing laws,
as well as the power of making new laws. And as the right of
taxation is included in the legislative power, it can be exercised only
through legislative action, and by the authority of law.
The legislative power is the vital function which animates, directs, and controls the whole operation of civil authority. When it
is conferred by the constitution in general terms, it extends to every
legitimate purpose of legislationpertaining to civil government, subject only to such limitations as are expressly provided in the constitution. And the power of taxation, a most important means employed by the legislative power, is as essential to the continued existence of civil government as the circulation of the blood is to the
human system. This sovereign attribute of civil power, in accordance with the terms by which it has been vested in the government
of this State, cannot in any manner, nor to any extent whatever,
be limited, abridged or surrendered by contract or sale, to any person or association of persons.
The plaintiff in error derived the usual powers of a corporation
from the law of its creation, including the important authority to
take lands, materials, &c., the subjects of private property, belonging to other persons, and appropriate the same to the purposes of
its plank road, and also the very liberal authority to charge any
rate of toll for the use of its road, which the directors might, in their
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discretion, prescribe. If upon the terms, and in the exercise of
these powers, the corporation had not sufficient inducement to construct its road, it was not competent for the legislature, by way of
contract, and in consideration that the company would exercise the
powers given it and construct its road, to surrender the constitutional power of taxation over it. The constitution of the State does
not clothe the General Assembly with the authority to surrender, or
part with any portion whatever of the taxing power by contract or
sale. No relinquishment or limitation of any part of the power of
taxation, can in any form, or to any extent whatsoever, be made the
consideration of a contract.
This power is a delegated trust of sovereignty, which from its
very nature and object, must remain perfect and in full operation at
every session of the legislature, and it cannot be restricted, abridged,
or to any extent surrendered by private contract. That the legislature of this State has not the constitutional authority, in conferring
special privileges on a corporation, to abridge to any extent, or in
any manner whatever surrender by contract any portion of the right
of taxation over it, has been settled by solemn adjudication, and is
not now an open question in this State. Debolt vs. The Ohio Life
Insurance and Trust Company, 1 Ohio S. R., 564; Toledo .Bank
vs. The City of Toledo, Ibid, 628.
This is decisive of this case, and upon this ground the judgment
of the Common Pleas must be affirmed. This is as far as some of
the members of the court deem it necessary to go. But in expressing the views of a majority of the court at least, I am warranted in
going further.
By the first section of the second article of the constitution, the
legislative power of the State is vested in general terms, in the General Assembly. This most important and comprehensive of all the
powers of government, being that in which the supremacy of the
government itself consists, must continue in full force and undiminished. The power of enacting laws necessarily comprehending full
power to amend and repeal existing laws, if full control over existing did not exist, the legislative power would be imperfect, and incompetent to the complete performance of its high functions. The
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legislature cannot at one session, by the enactment of a law, in any
manner, or to any extent whatsoever, limit or abridge the legislative
power vested by the constitution in this body, at any subsequent
session. There is no provision of the constitution which enables
the General Assembly in the enactment of a law, to provide by contract or otherwise against its amendment or repeal. If this could
be (lone, the sovereign power of legislation itself could be abridged
by contract, for the legislative power must be as ample and complete
in its capacity to alter and repeal existing laws, as it is in the power
of the enactment of new laws. If a law could in its nature be a
contract, it would be subject to the unavoidable condition of amendment and repeal by the legislative power of the State. But a law
and a contract are two things essentially different in their nature.
A law is a rule of action prescribed by the supreme power in a State,
which all persons within the sphere of its operations are bound to
obey. I Blackstone's Com., 40. A law is an enactment proceeding from the supreme power in the government, in consideration
of the public interests. The enactment of a law cannot be procured
by contract. There is no provision in the constitution of Ohio allowing any person or set of persons to purchase, or procure the enactment of a law, by contract. The exercise of the legislative power
cannot be made the subject of barter or sale. This highest function
of civil authority acts solely and alone from the overruling and
paramount considerations of the public interests. If the enactment
of laws could be procured by purchase or contract, the public interests would often be sacrificed to the corrupting considerations of
special and private interests. A law then, from its inherent nature,
cannot be a contract; on the contrary, it is a rule of action prescribed
by the supreme civil power, solely and alone from the paramount
consideration of the public interests. A contract is essentially different and distinct. It is an agreement between two competent
parties, upon a mutual and legal consideration, and in relation to a
matter which is the legitimate subject of bargain or sale.
Although a law cannot in its nature constitute a contract, yet it
may authorize the making of a contract. Contracts to which the
State is a party, are usually made under the authority of some ex-

PLANK ROAD COMPANY vs. HUSTED.

isting law, and in conformity to its directions.

But there is a

plain distinction between the law itself, and the contract entered
into under its authority. Where a contract is entered into pursuant
to the authority of a law, for the transfer of property or the performance of services, a vested right may be created separate and
distinct from the law itself, so that, even if the law be subsequently
amended or repealed, the obligations of the contract or the vested
rights created, remain unimpaired. The repeal or amendment would
be prospective, not retroactive in its operation, and therefore, not
operative against the authority by which the contract was made.
The distinction between a law and a contract made under its authority, is one which has been recognized by the Supreme Court of the
United States, and recently sanctioned by the Supreme Court of
Ohio, Fletcher vs. Peck, 9 Cranch, 87; The Charles River Bridge
vs. The Warren Bridge, 11 Peters, 530; Te Bank of Toledo vs.
Bond et al. 1 Ohio State R., 640.
The doctrine, however, that the charter of a private corporation
is a contract, rests upon the ground, that the law itself under which
the company organizes and acts as a legal person, is a contract
creating an exemption from the legislative power of amendment and
repeal, and this by implication and without express provision to that
effect! This absurd doctrine has been promulgated as law in this
country for a number of years, to sustain certain views of public
policy, and the whole doctrine is founded on the authority of the
decision of Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of The
-DartmouthCollege vs. 'oodward, 4 Wheat., 518, which, upon close
examination, is found not to sustain it. The gross absurdity of this
doctrine, and the authority which gave rise to it, is fully examined in
the opinion of this court in the cases of The Toledo Bank vs. The
City of Toledo, 1 Ohio S. R., 640; Knoup vs. The Piqua Bank,
Ibid, 604; and Mechanies and Traders Bank vs. Debolt, Ibid,
592.
In the case of the Test River Bridge Company vs. .Diz et al. 6
How*., 530, the Supreme CouA of the United States held, that the
right of eminent domain, one of the sovereign attributes of government, and essential to its preservation, and the proper performance
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of its functions, is paramount to the rights of private property, and
that not only the property, but the franchise of a corporation was
held subject to its exercise. The right of eminent domain is certainly not any more important and essential to the existence of
government and the proper exercise of its powers, than the right of
taxation, or the right of legislative control over existing laws by
amendment and repeal. The essential functions of sovereignty
are inherent in every distinct political community, which are necessary to guard its own existence, and to protect and promote the
public interests. The exercise of these highest acts of sovereignty
relate not only to the external relations of government, but extend
to the interior polity and relations of social life, and must be regulated with reference to the public interests and advantage of the
whole community. And all private rights must be held as subordinate and subject to the control of these indispensable functions of
civil authority. This does not affect the inviolability of private property. The obligations of contracts, and indeed, all rights of private
property, rest upon those incidental or implied conditions, which are
superinduced by the pre-existing and higher authority of the laws
of nature, of nations, and of the community in which they exist.
The right of taxation and the right of legislative control over existing laws by amendment and repeal, as well as the right of eminent
domain, are high trusts of delegated sovereign authority, which the
mere agents authorized to administer them, have no power to abridge
or surrender to any extent whatever. That the legislative power
may sometimes select its objects for taxation, and within its constitutional powers, provide a total or a partial exemption from taxation
for property of any particular kind, or the property of any particular persons, does not affect the question, provided such laws remain
subject to amendment and repeal. The taxing power is not abridged
or surrendered, so long as it is subject to legislative control. But
if the legislature can pass a law, and provide by contract against its
amendment or repeal at any subsequent session, it can surrender or
relinquish a portion of the legislative power. And if the legislature
can by the enactment of a law, provide a perpetual and irrepealable
exemption from taxation, it can virtually relinquish the taxing power
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for the benefit of those in whose favor the exemption is provided.
If the taxing power can be thus irretrievably relinquished for the benefit of corporations, the same thing can be done for the benefit of natural persons, and if it can be done for the few, it can be done for the
many. If the legislature can enact laws for the benefit of corporations, and by contract surrender the legislative control over them,
by amendment and repeal, it can do the same thing for the benefit
of natural persons. And if this can be done for a few favored persons, it can be done for the many. Thus the sovereign powers of
legislation and taxation could be surrendered or impaired so as to
destroy their efficiency to sustain the government, without the power
of subsequent legislation to remove the difficulty by amending or
repealing the laws. It was never intended by the constitution that
these high trusts of civil power should be thus liable to be crippled
and stripped of their efficiency and usefulness. It never was.intended that the legislature should be clothed with the authority to
surrender the powers, or any portion of them which are essential for
the preservation of the government itself. One of the great objects
of a written constitution, is to provide against legislative discretion,
which may lead to abuses, and ultimately to the destruction of the
government. The legislative power of the State, therefore, which is
by the constitution vested in the General Assembly, must continue in
full force and virtue at each succeeding session of that body, and remain wholly unimpaired by contract or other provision for its surrender or limitation, made at any preceding session of that body.
The ninth section of the charter of this company, providing the
exemption from taxation, was operative to protect the company from
taxation under the authority of any statute existing at the time the
act of incorporation was passed, and until the legislature should
otherwise provide. But notwithstanding this exemption would seem
to be perpetual in its terms, it must be construed with reference to
the constitutional powers of the body which enacted it, and therefore as perpetual only as against tax laws existing at the time of its
passage,but as wholly inoperative as against any subsequent laws
which might be thereafter enacted, imposing a tax on the corporation.
Judgment of the Court of Common Pleas affirmed.

BIRD vs. RAILROAD COMPANY.

South Carolina Equity Court of Appeals, Columbia, December
Term, 1855.
JOSEPII BIRD vs. THE WILMINGTON AND MANCHESTER RAILROAD COMPANY.
1. By the charter of the Wilmington and Manchester railroad company, it is provided,
that when any land or right of way is required for the construction of the road,
and the company and the proprietors of the land cannot agree upon the value
thereof, a commission shall issue from the Court of Common Pleas to assess the
value, whose return shall be made to the same court, and upon payment or tender
of the value so assessed, the lands or right of way shall vest in the company.
Held, that the company were not authorized to enter on the land for the purpose
of constructing the road until they had procured an assessment to be made, and
had paid or tendered the amount assessed, and that an injunction was properly
granted to restrain their proceedings,
2. Legislative license to corporations to enter upon and appropriate the lands of an
individual against his consent, is against common right, and such acts should be
strictly construed. Corporations deviating from the line prescribed by the act,
or transcending the authority vested in them, may be restrained by injunction.
8. As ancillary to the relief by injunction, it is competent for the Court of Chancery
to decree damages for waste or injury already sustained, the same to be ascertained by an issue quantum damnificatus, or in cases where neither the facts nor
amounts are complicated, by reference to the master of the court.

The opinion of Chancellor JOHNSTON in the Court below, was as
follows:"The bill in this case sets forth that the defendants have violently
and without the plaintiff's consent, entered upon his land adjacent
to the line of their road, cut down his timber, and dug up and subverted his soil, to his permanent and irreparable injury.
It appears that the plaintiff's land lies above the line of the road,
where it crosses the Great Pedee. It lies on the left bank of the
river, and stretches from a point some distance above the railroad
bridge which spans the river, down to that bridge, and extends back
from the river into the adjacent highlands.
The Company desiring to build a warehouse on the bank of the
river some distance above the bridge, laid out, through the plaintiff's
land, a track from this road up to that point, and being forbidden
by the plaintiff to proceed with their enterprise, caused the usual
course to be pursued, by the appointment of commissioners from the
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Court of Common Pleas. The return of the commissioners is of
course for the judgment of that court. But pending the cause there,
the plaintiff has filed his bill here.
The defendants plead in justification of the acts on the plaintiff's
land, the 15th section of the statute by which they were incorporated, (see Statute, 18th Dec., 1846, 11 Statutes at Large, 888,)
which section is in these words:
"That the president and directors of the said company, their officers, agents and
servants, shall have power and authority to enter upon alllands andtenements, through
which they may desire to conduct their railroad,and to lay out the same, according
to their pleasure, (so that the dwelling house, yard, garden, or grave-yard of no person be invaded, without his consent,) and lay out such contiguous lands, as they may
desire to occupy, as sites for depots, toll-houses, warehouses, engine sheds, workshops,
water stations, and other buildings, for the necessary accommodationof their agents
and servants, their horses, mules and other cattle, and for theprotection ofproperty
entrustedto their care. Provided,however, that the lands so laidout on the line of the
railroad, shall not exceed (except at deep cuts and fillings,) one hundred and twenty
feet in width ; (and at such deep cuts and fillings shall not exceed a width sufficient
for the construction of the banks and deposits of waste earth) ; and that the adjoining
land, for the sites of buildings, (unless the president and directors can agree with
the owner, or owners, for the purchase of the same), shall not exceed five acres in
any oneparceL"

I have no doubt that there are many cases where these companies, depending on their strength, may oppress the citizen; and that
often their subordinates, unknown to them, and beyond their control, may exert their petty authority very much to the annoyance
both of the public and of individuals.
I have no reason to suppose, however, that in this instance there
is any intention to oppress. The superintendent is acting in this
matter under a deliberate resolution of the company; and I dare
say the company sincerely believes in its right, under the charter,
to construct the track in question, and to lay out and appropriate a
site for a warehouse where it has.
The question is, whether its proceeding is authorized by the statute.
That question, as it arises out of the facts of the case, belongs to
another forum, before which it is now pending.
If the charter does not give the right claimed, the acts of the
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defendants as charged in the bill, constitute a pure trespass, for
which there is ample remedy at law. If the charter gives the right,
then the statute has given the remedy for such loss as the plaintiff
sustains by its exercise. On this ground alone I must dismiss the
bill.
I am unwilling, however, to part from a case of this character,
without stating, that it by no means follows from anything I have
said, that such companies may exercise even their legal powers without restraint. If, for example, such a company, keeping to its line,
attempted so to construct its road, or its buildings, as to make them
nuisances to the neighborhood, I have no doubt whatever of the right
of this court to restrain them. Take, as an example, the filling up
of a trestle, or the embanking of a hollow, without sufficient culverts
to prevent the stagnation of waters thus intercepted, thereby occasioning disease. In such a case of threatened irreparable mischief,
justice must interfere, to prevent or to remove the evil. But when
the injury amounts to a naked trespass, without more, I conceive
that this court cannot interfere. My impression is, that the statute
does not authorize the improvement designed, and does not bind
the private property of the plaintiff for such a purpose; but being
satisfied that he has a remedy in the case stated at law, and his case
being before a forum designated for its decision, I do not deem it
proper to express any decided opinion on this point.
It is ordered that the bill be dismissed."
Plaintiff appealed on the ground that the injuries done and
threatened to be done by defendants to the realty of the plaintiff,
entitled him to the aid of the court by injunction, as well as compensation for the injury already done.
The appeal was heard at Columbia, December, 1855, and the
opinion of the court was delivered by
DuinKI, Ch.- The concluding remarks of the chancellor are
founded on a misapprehension of the facts. When the bill was fied
and an injunction granted by the commissioner, no proceedings were
pending or had been instituted at law for the appointment of corn-
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missioners to assess the value of the premises, &c., as prescribed by
the act. By the sixteenth clause'of the act for the incorporation of
the Wilmington and Manchester railroad company, it is declared,
that where the parties cannot agree upon the value, lands may be
taken for the purposes designated by the act at a valuation to be
fixed by commissioners appointed by the Court of Common Pleas.
If an appeal is made from the valuation, it is further provided that
the pendency of the appeal "shall not prevent the works intended
to be constructed from proceeding;" and provision is therein made
for the payment of the valuation. Before striking a spade into the
plaintiff's land, it was, therefore, obviously the duty of the company,
in any view of their rights, to have adopted the preliminary measures of having the value of the land, proposed to be taken, assessed
by an application to the Court of Common Pleas for the appointment of commissioners. This would probably have presented the
inquiry as to their right under the charter. It is abundantly shown
by Chancellor Kent, in Gardner vs. Newburgh, 2 Johns. 162,
that until compensation has been paid,'or provision has been made for
securing compensation to the proprietor of the land, "it would be
unjust, and contrary to the first principles of government, and
equally contrary to the intention of the statute, to take from the
plaintiff his undoubted right." On this ground alone, he granted
an injunction, and if, in this case the facts had been fully disclosed
at the hearing, the bill would not have been dismissed.
But it is proposed now to consider the authority of the defendants
under the act of 1846. The chancellor, in his decree expresses his
impression that the statute which constitutes the charter of the
defendants, "does not authorize the improvement designed by the
company, and does not bind the private property of the plaintiff for
such purpose." Upon examining the clause of the charter, it is
manifest that power is given to the company for two distinct purposes: .First,they are authorized to lay out the line of the railroad, and for this purpose, to pass through the lands of individuals,
provided that the lands so laid out on the line of the railroad shall
not exceed (except at deep cuts and fillings) one hundred and
twenty feet in width. Second, they are authorized "1to lay out
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such contiguous lands as they may desire to occupy as sites for
depots, toll houses, warehouses, engine sheds, workshops, water stations, and other buildings for the necessary accommodation of their
servants and agents, their horses, mules, and other cattle, and for
the protection of property entrusted to their care, provided that the
adjoining land for the sites of buildings, (unless the president and
directors of the company can agree with the owner or owners for
the purchase of the same) shall not exceed five acres in any one
parcel."
The object of the enactment seems sufficiently transparent. The
hundred and twenty feet in width allowed for the track of the railroad might not be more than sufficient for that purpose. The company must have also depots, toll houses, engine houses, warehouses,
&c., &c., for which purpose they would be obliged to encroach on
the adjoining lands beyond the one hundred and twenty feet of
width. Perhaps they might desire to establish at the same point,
u depot, toll house, workshops, warehouses, &c. They were therefore empowered by the legislature to lay out such contiguous lands
for these objects, provided they did not take of the adjoining land
more than five acres in any one parcel. No species of property is
held by individuals with more tenacity, none is guarded by the constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to'the freehold or
inheritance. When the legislature interferes with This right, and
for great public purposes, appropriates the estate of an individual
without his consent, the plain meaning of the act should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation.
This case could be better
understood with the aid of a chart of the proposed improvement.
But the railroad spans the Great Pedee, and on the western
side strikes the land of Gibson. Some four hundred yards west
of the river and beyond Gibson's land, the line of the road
passes the land of the plaintiff. It happens that his tract extends
in a north-east direction until' it strikes the Pedee river some
four hundred yards north of the railroad bridge, which crosses the
river. The defendants propose to construct a tram road, or some
other narrow railwway, extending from the railroad where it
,trikes the plaintiff's land, and run it in a north-east direction until
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it strikes the river, and there to erect a warehouse for the convenience of receiving cotton, &c., from the river boats. As the tram
road will be narrow, and not much space will be occupied by the
warehouse, it is estimated, that altogether not more than five acres
of plaintiff's land will be taken. We concur with the chancellor
that the act does not warrant the proceedings of the defendant in
thus appropriating the plaintiff's land. The proposed site of the
warehouse is up the river, nearly one-third of a mile distant from
the railroad bridge. The distance of the proposed site by the tram
road would be still farther from the railroad. The intention of the
act was only to authorize the company to extend the width given
for the line, so as to enable them to erect thereon depots, toll houses,
warehouses, &c. If Darlington village had been two miles north
of the railroad, it might be very convenient for the company to locate warehouses, &c., at that point. If the plaintiff had been so
unfortunate as to own the intermediate land, could the defendants
run a narrow road through his land against his will, and fix their
warehouse or depot at the village under the clause of- their charter
allowing them to lay out the lands adjoining the railroad for the
site of their depot, warehouses, &c.? If Mr. Gibson had owned a
narrow strip of land fifty feet in width, between the railroad and
plaintiff's land, it is not pretended they could run the proposed road
and fix their site on plaintiff's land at the river. Doubtless, it
may be very convenient for the defendants to have this particular
site.for a warehouse, to receive cotton from river boats and for other
purposes. It may be very inconvenient and expensive to erect one
at a different point. If so, it must be procured in the ordinary
mode adopted when a man desires to possess his neighbor's land.
If this site be necessary for the transaction of the business of the
road, or a great public convenience, and the plaintiff is obstinate in
resisting such improvement, resort may be had to the same power
which granted the charter, and the same may be amended, as has
been recently done in analogous cases.
The next inquiry presented is, whether under these circumstances,
the plaintiff was entitled to the injunction granted by the commi9
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sioner.' It is not doubted that for ordinary cases of mere trespass,
the party has an adequate and more appropriate remedy at law, and
it would not be advisable (says an eminent jurist) to introduce the
chancery remedy as a substitute, except in instances of trespass
which go to the destruction of the inheritance, or where the mischief
is remediless. In a recent approved treatise on equity jurisdiction
it is said to be "now settled that an injunction will lie for protection of a title, admitted or proved at law, whenever the act complained of is attended with permanent results, destroying, or materially altering the estate." The strongest authority cited on behalf
of the defendants, was Chancellor Kent's judgment in Jerome
vs. Boss, 7 Johns. 336, the last act (it may be observed) of his
judicial life, and not unworthy of his fame. One of the grounds on
which the chancellor dissolved the injunction was, that the act of
the defendants (in removing some stone and gravel from the land of
the plaintiff), was a mere trespass. But in the same judgment he
cites with approbation the case of Agar vs. Tile Regent's Canal
Company, Coop. Eq. R. 77, in which the defendants were empowered
by a private act of parliament to cut a canal; the line of the canal
had been prescribed, and they departed from that line, and were
carrying the canal through a garden and rick yard, and Lord Eldon
allowed an injunction. Also, the case of S/and vs. Renderson, 2 Dow.
519, in which the Aberdeen Canal Navigation Company were charged
with having taken and appropriated lands to their use, by unwarrantably deviating from the line particularly prescribed by statute,
and an injunction to restrain the Canal Company within their limits
vas admitted to be proper. "But in both these cases (says Chancellor Kent) the companies were making a permanent appropriation of
the land and destroying the inheritance, and upon the principle acknowledged in all the cases it was necessary to restrain them." It
is not doubted that in this case the defendants are attempting to
make a permanent appropriation of the land admitted to belong to
the plaintiff, and thereby to destroy the inheritance. In such case
upon acknowledged principles, the plaintiff is entitled to the aid of this
1In some districts of South Carolina "a masterin chancery" is styled "Commissioner," and by special act, has authority to grant a temporary injunction.
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court. A case was decided in December, 1853, by the Appeal
Court of Chancery in England, in which the principles of the court
are thus stated by Lord Cranworth, L. J.: "We accede," says he,
"to the general observation, that persons obtaining from the legislature by acts of parliament, like those now before us, powers to
interfere with rights of property for their own purposes, are bound
strictly to adhere to the powers so conceded to them, to do no more
than the legislature has sanctioned, and to proceed only in the mode
which the legislature has pointed out." "In such cases, a plaintiff
seeking the assistance of a court of equity, by way of injunction,, is
bound to show that he has an interest in preventing the defendants
from doing, what is in fact, or may well be called, a violation of
their contract with the legislature. He must show not only that
the defendants are committing, or intended to commit a wrong, but
also that the wrong complained of does occasion, or will occasion,
loss or damage to him." The injunction as to part of the bill was
made perpetual, and as to another part, was dissolved, because the
plaintiffs showed no interest in the lands. The case is The Mayor,
ft., of Liver2pool vs. Te Chorley Water Works 0ompany, and is
reported in 21 Eng. L. &Eq. R. 624. It is principally instructive, as
showing the strict sense in which such extraordinary powers granted
to corporations should be construed. It might be suggested, that
public improvements may be sometimes greatly retarded by this
summary interference on the part of the court. But if the right
of property in the plaintiff be conceded or established, and the
license or warrant of the defendant to encroach upon it is deemed
doubtful by a judicial magistrate, the defendant should withhold
his hand until the right be established, and it was so held in F'arick
vs. The Corporation of New York, 4 Johns. 53. The power
of this court can rarely be exercised with more salutary effect than
in protecting the rights of the humble citizen against the strong arm
of a powerful corporation.
The plaintiff also seeks compensation for the injury sustained by
the unlawful acts of the defendants. It is stated by Mr. Justice
Story, that "1as a general proposition, for breaches of contract, and
other wrongs and injuries cognizable at law, courts of equity do not
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entertain jurisdiction to give redress by way of compensation or
damages, where these constitute the sole objects of the bill." Story,
§ 794. "Compensation or damages, (it should seem) ought therefore, (says he) ordinarily to be decreed in equity only as incidental
to other relief sought by the bill and granted by the court." It does
not ordinarily attach except as ancillary to some other relief. "The
mode by which such compensation or damages are ascertained in
such cases, is either by reference to the master, or by directing an
issue quantum damnificatus, which is tried by a jury. The latter,
he says, was almost the invariable course in former times, in all
cases where the compensation was not extremely clear, as to its eleinents and amount, and is still commonly resorted to in cases of a
complicated nature. But the same inquiries may be had before a
master, and in cases where such inquiries do not involve much complexity of facts or amounts, this course is often now adopted." Idem
§ 795. In Watson vs. Hunter, 5 Johns. 169, Chancellor Kent
says, that in cases of waste, it is the practice of the court to grant
injunctions to prevent or stay the future commission of waste; and
the remedy for waste already committed is merely incidental to the
jurisdiction in the other case, assumed to prevent multiplicity of
suits and to save the party the necessity of resorting to trover at
law. And he cites the authority of Lord Hardwicke, in Jesus College vs. Bloom, 3 Atk. 262. It was there stated, that "where the
bill was for an injunction to prevent waste, and for waste already
committed, the court, to prevent a double suit, would award an injunction to prevent future waste, and decree an account and satisfaction for what was past. The ground for coming into chancery
was to stay waste, and not for satisfaction for the damages, as the
commission of waste was a tort, and the remedy lay at law. But
to prevent multiplicity of suits, the court, on bills for injunctions to
stay waste, and where waste had already been committed, would
make a complete decree, and give the injured party a satisfaction for
what had been done, and not put him to another action at law."
The same doctrine was held by Lord Hardwicke in Garth vs. Cotton, 1 Yes. 528.
The principal doubt entertained by the court is that suggested by
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the master of the rolls, in Nelson vs. Bridges, 2 Beav. 239. It is
a ease of damages and not of account. No profits have been made
by the defendants, and the object is to ascertain the amount of loss
which the plaintiff has sustained by their wrongful acts. In that
case, after much consideration, he ordered an issue quantum damnificatus. And in some points of view this would be the most satisfactory course here. But the plaintiff, by applying to this court,
waives all claim for vindictive damages, and the actual injury and
loss sustained may probably be as well ascertained before the commissioner as by subjecting the parties to the delay and expense of a
trial at law. It is therefore ordered and decreed, that the decree of
the Circuit Court be reformed; that the injunction granted by the
commissioner be made perpetual; and that it be referred to the commissioner to ascertain and report upon the loss and injury sustained
by the plaintiff in consequence of the unauthorized acts of the defendants.
0hittenden County, Vermont Supreme Court.
NOYES vs. RUTLAND AND BURLINGTON RAILROAD COMPANY.
1. Railroads, as common carriers, may make a valid contract to carry beyond the
limits of their own route, and thus assume all responsibility, adopt the acts, and

become liable for the negligences of others.
2. A carrier by contract, may undertake a personal delivery beyond the limits of
his route, of merchandise entrusted to him.
3. A corporation cannot adopt the acts of its agents, as between itself and strangers,
when such acts are beneficial to itself, and repudiate the same acts, when the
result is disastrous, on the ground of want of authority in the agent to act under
its charter of incorporation.

This case was argued, and held under advisement until September, 1855, when the
Opinion of the Court was delivered by
REDFIELD, Ch. J. - It seems to be now well settled, that railroad companies, as common carriers, may make a valid contract
to carry beyond the limits of their own road, either by land or
water, and thus become liable for the acts and neglects of other
carriers, in no sense under their control. .MuschamPvs. L. and
P. Junction Railway Company, 8 M. & W. 421; Weed vs. Schenectady and SaratogaR. B. Company, 19 Wendell, 534; Farmers
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and Mechanics Bank vs. Champlain Transportation Company,
23 Vt. R. 186.
It has never been questioned that carriers, whether natural or
artificial persons, might, by usage or contract, bind themselves to
deliver parcels or merchandise beyond the strict limits of their
line, in town and country; and in such case, could only exonerate
themselves by a personal delivery. 23 Vt. R. 186, and cases there
cited.
It seems to us, in principle, that these two propositions control
the present case; for if a railroad comphny may contract for
carrying merchandise and parcels: beyond the limits of their line,
where the carriage is by porters, stages, by steamboats, or other
water-craft, or by other railroads, and this is to be justified upon
the ground of usage and convenience, or common understanding
and consent, the same rule of construction must equally extend to
contracts to receive freight at points on the line before it reaches
the company entering into the contract. It may be true, in one
sense, that this is extending the duties and powers of the company
beyond the strictest interpretation of the words of the charter.
But the time is now past, when, as between the company and
strangers, any such literal interpretation of the charter is attempted
to be adhered to. It is true, that such corporations, even as to
strangers, are not allowed to assume obligations altogether beyond
the general objects of their incorporation, as if they should assume
to build steamboats, or other railroads, perhaps. But, within the
general business of their creation, a very considerable latitude is
allowed in contracts with strangers. This is done for the advantage of the company, as well as others, and to avoid embarrassments in the common business of life, which must be constantly
liable to occur, upon any such limited construction of the powers
of corporations, as is contended for by the plaintiffs below. These
corporations are now held liable for a nuisance, in obstructing highways-for damages, in consequence of a departure from the ordinary and safe mode of constructing their embankments, although
attempted, in that form, to aid a manufacturing interest, by making
the embankment serve the double purpose of a dam, for embankment for the track of the road-and in many other cases, where, if
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the stockholders had interfered, in the first instance, the agents of
the company would have been restrained from doing the acts in
the name of the company. But if the corporators acquiesce in
the extension of the business of the company, even beyond the
strict limits of its charter, upon the most literal interpretation, and
strangers are thereby induced to contract, upon the faith of the
authority of the agents of such companies, the companies are not
at liberty to repudiate the authority of such agents, when their
transactions prove disastrous.
This principle is strikingly illustrated by the false issues of
stock by the directors of companies, even beyond the limit of
their charters, which the courts have attempted generally to maintain, even by the necessary finesse of lessening the nominal
value of the other genuine shares, which is certainly carrying the
matter to the very extreme of reason and sound logic. But of the
soundness of the general principle, to the extent of the present
case, we think there is no possible question. If this company can
assume to carry freight from Burlington to New York, so may
they equally from Highgate to Troy, and New York. The case
of Jordan vs. Fall River Railroad Company, 5 Cushing, 69, is
a well-considered case, and precisely in point. Cases like that
of Livingston vs. Lynch and others, 4 Johns. Ch. 573, and many
others, which concern the power of the majority to compel the
minority to the extension of the business of the company beyond
its constitutional limits, have no proper bearing upon the present
question. The point blanc question here is, whether the company,
by its agents, and the consent of its corporators, shall continue to
carry on its business in any given mode, not contrary to the general
course of business in the vicinity, so long as it prove profitable to
the company, and when any disaster occurs, be allowed to shield
themselves from liability, by a resort to the most literal construction of their charter powers, which they had themselves extended,
by a liberal construction of its terms ? It would seem there could
be but one answer; and such is the uniform current of the more
recent decisions of the courts upon the subject.
Judgment affirmed.

JENNESON vs. RAILROAD COMPANY.

District Court of Pdladelplhia. January, 1856.
JENNESON vs. TIE CAMDEN AND AMBOY RAILROAD AND
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY.
1. A nonsuit will not be taken off which has been granted by reason of a discrepancy between the allegations in the narr. and the proof at the trial.
2. Semble, That where a carrier receives goods marked for a particular destination,
beyond the route for which he professes to carry, and beyond the terminus of his
road, he is bound only, in the absence of any special agreement, to transport and
deliver such merchandise according to the established usage of the business, and
is not liable for losses beyond his own line.
S. Construction of a special bill of lading.

The narr.in this case, is in assumpsit. It contains several counts,
in each of which a contract is stated to have been made by the
defendant, with tho plaintiff, to carry a chest, containing wearing
apparel of the plaintiff, from Burlington, Nlew Jersey, to the town
of Camden, in the State of Onio.
A witness for the plaintiff proved the delivery, by the plaintiff, to
the defendants at Burlington, KTew Jersey, of the chest in question-of an offer to pay the freight, and that it was declined, the
agent of defendants saying it might be settled for at the end of the
line.
The following receipt was then given by the defendant's agent to
the plaintiff.
CAMDEN AND AMBOY RAILROAD
AND

TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,
Marks and NYumbers.
1 chest, marked 'Matthew

FOR THE

Conveyance of Merchandise and Produce of all kinds,
To Philadelphia, N"VewYork, and intermediateplaces.

Jenneson, Camden, Ohio.
Burlington, Veb'y 3, 1854.
To be shipped for Camden, Ohio, from New York.

REcEIVED from Matthew Jenneson, 1 chest, marked
and numbered as per margin, which we promise to
deliver at our office in New York, upon payment of
freight therefor, at the rate of 261 cents per 100 lbs.
J. L. DOBBINS,
For the Company.
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The plaintiff offered this receipt in evidence. The defendants
objected that it did not agree with the undertaking averred in the
narr; that the narr. stated that the chest was to be carried from
Burlington, New Jersey, where the chest was received, to Camden,
in the State of Ohio; whereas, by the receipt, it was to be carried
merely to New York, the terminus of the defendant's line and
means of conveyance.
The Court inquired whether it was intended to follow up this
receipt with any other evidence showing that it was agreed to carry
the chest to Camden, Ohio, as laid in the declaration. Plaintiff's
counsel said he had no other evidence; that he relied upon the
receipt, and called the attention of the court to the words written
on the margin of it, "to be shipped for Camden, Ohio, from New
York."
Whereupon the receipt was rejected, and there being no other
evidence, a nonsuit was ordered by the court. The plaintiff now
moves to take off the nonsuit.
Mr. Frederick . fHeer, for the motion.
Messrs. Figh and Mallery, contra.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
STROUD, J.-The only question is whether this receipt contained
an undertaking by the defendants to carry the chest beyond the
terminus of their line, or rather, beyond the place named in the
receipt, the "office of the defendants, in New York."
The language of the receipt is plain and positive-" which we
promise to deliver at our offiee in New York, upon payment of
freight therefor at the rate of 261 cents per 100 lbs." For what
purpose the memorandum, " To be shipped for Camden, Ohio, from
New York," was made, we are not called upon to determine. We
do determine that it did not enlarge the defendant's promise, as set
forth in the body of the instrument: that it does not import an
agreement by the defendants, that they would transport the chest
to Camden, Ohio, and then deliver it to the plaintiff, which is the
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allegation in the declaration. It was admitted by the plaintiff's
counsel that the chest was safely carried to New York, that it had
been put in the way of transportation to its destination, by delivery
to a proper railway transportation company for that purpose, but
what became of it afterwards could not be ascertained.
Questions very similar to that which has here arisen, have
occurred several times in England, and in some of our sister States.
Aluschamp vs. Di e Lancaster and Preston Junction Railway
Company, 8 Mees. & Wels., 421, was the ease of a parcel delivered
at Lancaster, addressed to a place in -Derbyshire,beyond the line
of the Lancaster and Preston Railway. Baron ROLn, before
whom the cause was tried, told the jury, that a carrier who takes
into his care a parcel directed to a particular place, and does not
by positive agreement limit his responsibility to a part only of the
distance, undertakes prima facie to carry the parcel to its destination, and that the rule was not varied by the fact that that place
was beyond the limits within which the carrier professed to carry.
This ruling was sanctioned by the court in bane.
In a subsequent case, Watson vs. The Ambergate, Nottingham
and Boston Railway Company, 3 Eng. Law & Eq. Reports, 497,
the decision in luschamp vs. The Lancaster, &c., was approved.
In this country, the courts have held, that when goods are delivered to a carrier, marked for a particular place, but unaccompanied by any other directions for their transportation and delivery
except such as might be inferred from the marks themselves, the
carrier is only bound to transport and deliver them according to
the established usage of the business in which he is engaged,
whether that usage were known to the party from whom they were
received or not. Van Santvoord vs. St. John, 6 Hill, (N. Y.)
Rep., 157. Farmers and Mechanics Bank vs. Champlain Trans.
Co., 18 Verm. R., 140, and 23 ib., 209.
In Nutting vs. ConnecticutRiver B. R. Co., 1 Gray, 502, a receipt
was given of this description: "Northampton, Mass., received of
Ebenezer Nutting, for transportation to New York, 9 boxes, marked,"
&c. Two of these boxes were lost between Springfield, Mass., and
New Haven, Conn., being beyond the terminus of the defendant's
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road. No connection in business was shown to exist between the
defendants and the proprietors of the connecting road, nor was pay
taken for the transportation beyond Springfield, which was the terminus of the defendant's road.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts held, that the true construction of this contract was, that the goods should be safely carried to the terminus of the defendant's road, and there delivered to
the carriers on the connecting road, to be forwarded to their proper destination.
This decision was made upon a case stated. uJ~scTamp vs. Lancaster and -PrestonJunction Railway, 8 M. & W. 421, was cited
on behalf of the plaintiff, but the court disapproved of that decision, and held that, to bind a company under the circumstances of
this case, the burden was upon the plaintiff to show a special contract by the company to carry the goods beyond the terminus of
its own railway.
There is another case which was cited on the argument before
us, by the counsel of the defendant. In this it was decided by a
divided court, that, where a passenger paid the fare to a point
several miles beyond the terminus of the defendant's railroad,
receiving from the conductor of the cars a ticket in this form:
"cNew Haven and Northampton Company-Conductor's TicketNew Haven to Collinsville, by stage from Farmington,"
that the company was not responsible for any injury sustained
by the passenger on the stage road between Farmington and Collinsville, The case was tried twice. A new trial was granted
after the first trial, on a ground corresponding with that taken in
Nutting vs. The Connecticut Biver Railroad Company, 1 Gray,
502; but, after the second trial, in which the verdict was, as it had
been on the first, for the plaintiff, the court, in setting aside the
second verdict, rested its opinion on the ground that the conductor
had no authority to bind the company to carry beyond the limits
of its railway, because the company itself could not make any such
binding contract. Hood vs. . .& N. E. R. R. Co. 22 Conn.
R. 1, 502.
The case before us does not require, in support of the conclu-
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sion to which we have come, the adoption of the rulings in any
of the cases in our sister States, which have been referred to.
The nonsuit on the trial was placed distinctly upon the principle
that the evidence did not support the declaration;that the allegata
and probata did not agree. The declaration alleged that the goods
were to be carried from Burlington, New Jersey, to Camden, Ohio:
whereas the receipt was express, that they were to be delivered at
the Company's office at New York, and the charge of freight was
to Nbrew York only, and not beyond.
Motion dismissed.
Nor.-It
is a question of much practical importance whether carriers by railroad
who have received merchandise to be taken according to its address to a point beyond the line of the road which receives it, and beyond the point to which their own
means of conveyance extends, are liable as common carriers, for losses which occur
beyond that point, or are to be considered as having contracted to carry to the end of
their own line, and then employing other connecting lines at its termination as fresh
agents to complete the carriage.

It is quite clear, that a carrier may contract to

transport beyond his own line, and may make connecting lines his agent, and thus
become responsible to the owners of merchandise for its loss at any period or any
place while it is in transit.

Story on Bailin.

558; Shelford on Railw., 486; 3d ed.

same book, Am. ed. Judge Bennett's notes; Hodges on Railw., 614, 615, notes 2d
ed.; Smith's Mer. Law, 867, 3d ed. notes by Am. eds.; .Fowles vs. The Great Western
Railw. Co., 7 Ex. 698; W'eed vs. The Sar. 4- Schen.R. R., 19 Wend. 834; Muschamp vs.
The Lancaster, d-c., 8 M. & W. 421, 2 Eng. Railway Cases, 444; Watson vs. The
Ambergate, 4-c., 3 Eng. Law & Eq. R., 497; Noyes vs. The Rutland Railway Co.,
supra 231, per Redfield, Ch. J. ; Van Santvoord vs. St. John, 25 Wend. 669 ; 6 Hill,
157, S. C.; Farmers4 Mechanics Bankvs. Champlain Trans.Co., 18Verm. 140, and 23
Verm. 209; Erne vs. New York 4 ErieR. R., in New York Marine Court before Phillips
J., MS.; Ackley vs. Kellog, 8 Cow. 223 ; Hood vs. New York and New Haven R. R. Co.,
22 Conn. 1, 14, 15, 508-512; Edwards on Bailin. 528; Scotthorn vs. The South Staffordshire Railw. Co., 8 Exch. 341, 18 Eng. L. & Eq. R., 553; Crouch vs. The London
and North- 1estern Railw. Co., 14 C. B. 255; 25 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 287; Wilcox vs.
Parmlee, 3 Sandford R. 310.
But the case most difficult of solution is, where the shipper delivers his merchandise addressed to a point beyond the route to whose custody it is delivered, and it is
received without agreement of any kind, except that which the law creates by the
mere delivery and receipt.

This question was much discussed in the leading En-

glish case of Muschamp vs. The Lancaster, 4-c., cited and commented on by Judge
Stroud, p. 236; Watson vs. The Ambergate, Ntlottingham, and Boston Railw. Co., was
the case of certain models or plans of a machine to load colliers, sent by the plaintiff
from Grantham to Cardiff to compete for a prize of one hundred guineas, and which
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arrived too late for the competition, by which the plaintiff lost his chance of success.
When the package was delivered to the storing master at Grantham, he said he could
take pay only to Nottingham, as he had no rates beyond, and he erased the -words
"1paid to Bristol," and substituted "paid to Nottingham," without the knowledge of
the plaintiff. The original direction was left on the package, which was detained at
Bristol and did not arrive at Cardiff until the day after the award was made. In the
opinions of the court this contract is treated as a contract to carry from Grantham
to Cardiff, and the rule laid down by Baron Rolfe held to apply.
The Court of Exchequer in Scotthornvs. The South StaF'ordshireRailw. Co., 8 Exeh.
341 ; 18 Eng. L. & Eq. R. 553, affirmed 3luscham2p vs. The Lancaster, 4-c., and held
that where a carrier received goods to carry from one station to another, he was
liable for the loss during any part of the transit, though it may happen on the line
of railway belonging to another company. And in Crouch vs. The London and NorthWestern Ratlw. Co., 14 C. B. 255; 25 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 287, the Court of Common
Pleas after elaborate arguments, held, affirming the preceding decisions, that a common carrier, professing to carry to a place which is beyond the realm, was still subject to the common law liability of a carrier for hire, and was bound to perform all
the duties assumed and implied by that relation.
The doctrine of the English courts must be considered as settled, that carriers by
railroad, who receive merchandise to be transported beyond the line of their
own route without any special agreement, do not limit their liability to their own
route only, but are held liable for losses which may occur beyond it, or perhaps, to
speak more accurately, they are held liable upon the exact contract made, which is
in general, a question of fact, and is to be determined by the finding of a jury; and
in the absence of any special agreement, the presumption which arises from bare
proof of the delivery of the goods to the carrier addressed to a place beyond the
limits of the carrier's own route is, that he undertakes the delivery at that place.
But the rule to be deduced from the American decisions may be stated in the language of Judge Stroud, "that when goods are delivered to a carrier, marked for a
particular place, but unaccompanied by any other directions for their transportation
and delivery except such as might be inferred from the marks themselves, the carrier is only bound to transport and deliver them according to the established usages
of the business." Van Santvoord vs. St. John; Farmers Bank vs. Chomp. Tran.
Co.; Hood vs. Nrew York I New Haven R?. R2.; Nutting vs. Conn. .River R. R.
In the case of Hood vs. The N. Y. N. Haven R. R. Co., Ellsworth, J., dissented
from the English doctrine, and held the following language:
"We are aware that in the cases cited from the English books, it seems to be held
that if a railroad company receives at its depot goods marked to be forwarded beyond its own road, and evenbeyond any other railroad, this is Prima facie evidence
of a contract to carry the goods to the place of destination. We will not say that in
these English cases, since there was no evidence on the part of the defendants to disprove the primafaciecase, the defendants were not rightly subjected in damages for
a loss beyond their road. Indeed, the judges intimate that there may have been a
partnership throughout the route.
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But if more than this is meant, and that a railroad company, by receiving freight
at its depot, became responsible to carry it, as it were, by guaranty or insurance, to
the place of destination, at any distance from the road, and that this is an inference
which cannot be disproved by showing the facts, as in this case, we are not prepared
to give it our assent. We think it an unnatural inference, and a contract not, of
course to be drawn from the fact, that a chartered company of limited extent has
taken goods to carry over its road.
But if we are wrong in this, it does not follow that the doctrine of the English
cases, as to freight, is to be applied topassengers;passengers take care of themselves.
And even as to freight, were such a question before us, we believe the true doctrine
to be this: where goods are delivered to a carrier, marked for a particular destination, without any directions as to their transportationand delivery, save such asmay
be inferred from the marks themselves, the carrieris onlybound to transport according to the established usage of business in which he is engaged, whether the consignor know of the usage or not. The carrier becomes a mere forwarder of the goods
to the end of his own portion of the route, and is then bound to use due diligence in
seeking for and handing over the goods to the next carrier."
Van Santvoord vs. St. John, 6 Hill, 157, was the case of a box marked " J .Petre,
Little Falls, Herkimer Co.;" it was delivered to the Swiftsure line, and the following
receipt given, "Itee'd from St. John on board Ontario, onebox merchandise, marked
J.Petre," &c. This was the contract. The usage to deliver to the next carrier was
shown. And the construction of this contract was held to be, that the box had been
delivered to the carrier with the intention that he should transport it in the usual
and customary way, and that the usage of the business must be considered as one of
the elements of the contract, and the shipper could not avail himself of his ignorance
of this usage, it being his business to inform himself.
In the .FarmersBanc vs. The Champ. Trans. Co., 18 Verm. 140, Kelly, J., 'commenting on Van Sanivoord vs. St. John, says ,the doctrine of that case is in substance this; that where goods are delivered to a carrier marked fora particular place,
without any directions as to their transportation and delivery except such as may be
inferred from the marks themselves, the carrier is only bound to transport and deliver them according to the established usage of the business in which he is engaged,
whether the consignor knew of such usage or not. With the reasoning and authority of that case we are well satisfied. It is founded in good sense, and sustainable
upon principle."
In Xutting vs. Conn.River R. R., Metcalf, J., cites and applies the ruling in Van
Santvoordvs. St. John, 6 Hill, 157, and takes occasion to dissent from the broad doctrine of the Court of Exchequer in tuschamp vs. The Lancaster, 1c., and Queen's Bench
in Watson vs. The Ambergate, Ic. The courts of New York,. Vermont, Connecticut
and Massachusetts, have all dissented from this doctrine, and have enunciated the
rule stated by Judge Stroud, p. 236, which must now be considered the better and
safer opinion, in this country at least.-Eds. Am. L. R.

EX PARTE DAWSON.

In the Surrogate's Court, City of New York.
IN

THE MATTER

OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF MARY JAY DAWSON,
AN INFANT.'

1. Where an infant, a native citizen of the State of New York, and domiciled in the
City of New York, and having a guardian duly appointed at the place of domicil,
was clandestinely, and adversely to the wishes of the guardian, removed from his
jurisdiction and taken to England-Held, That the guardian was justified in
attempting to recover the custody of the ward, by invoking the aid of the English
Courts, and that the expenses of such proceeding were a proper charge on the
infant's estate.
2. And where the English Court of Chancery, when refusing to award the custody
of the minor to the American'guardian, decreed that the guardian should transmit
the income of the minor's property to England to be disposed of under the direction of that Court--Hdd That under the circumstances, there was no good reason
for deferring er comitate to the decision of the foreign tribunal, and permission was
therefore refused to the guardian to transmit the funds abroad.
3. The Surrogate, in respect to minors residing in his county, has the same extent
of authority as to the appointment of guardians, as was possessed by the late
Court of Chancery of this State, whose jurisdiction was commensurate with that
of the English Court of Chancery. The statute directing such notice to be given
to the relatives residing in the county as the Surrogate shall think reasonable,
does not exclude that officer from directing notice to any parties likely to be interested in the welfare of the minor, whether residing in the County or State, or
even in a foreign country.
4. In making the appointment of guardian, the Surrogate's power and discretion are
entirely unlimited, except by such known and established principles as govern the
conscience of all Courts of Equity. Relatives, whether residing in another county
or State, may be appointed to the guardianship, if they are proper persons, and
give the requisite security. The consent of relatives is not requisite to the
appointment. The authority of the Surrogate is not limited in this respect-the
relatives have no control in the matter, and they have no interest as parties, but
receive notice merely to inform the CQurt so as (e make the best appointment for
the welfare and interests of the child.
5. The Surrogate possesses power to remove a guardian, on proper cause being
shown.
6. The powers of a guardian appointed by the Surrogate are not restricted by locality, more than in the case of any other officer in this State. -He is recognized as
I This case will be found in 3 Brad. Surr. Rep., not yet published. We are indebted to the courtesy of-lr. Surrogate Bradford, for some of the sheets of his volume.
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the lawful guardian throughout the bounds of the State. He cannot, in a strict
sense, exercise authority out of this State, but he is no more a local officer than
an executor, or administrator, or a guardian appointed by the Court of Chancery.
Except as connected by the Constitution of the Uuited States, which does not
touch the civil domestic government, New York is as much a foreign State, relatively to the other States of the Union, as England is relatively to France.
7. There is no reason why the same degree of comity should not be extended to the
judicial action of the Surrogates' Courts in the State of New York, that would
be extended to any other tribunal of a foreign country in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction.
8. From comity and considerations of mutual interest, foreign States recognize and
give effect almost universally to those laws of the domicil which constitute the
status, quality, or capacity of the person, and which place minors under the
authority of guardians and tutors, respect being had to the sentence of the appropriate tribunal in the place of domicil.
9. In the case of a minor born in the City of New York, of a father there resident,
a naturalized citizen, and a mother there resident a native citizen, the residence
of the parents there continuing until their decease, the place of birth and the
domicil of the parents, made New York the place of the domicil of the child.
10. The domicil of origin can be changed only by choice, and a domicil of choice
cannot be acquired by the act of the minor, or of any other person, except the
parents or the guardian.
11. By the common law, an alien signifies one born in a foreign country, and it is
the doctrine of the English law that natural born subjects cannot divest themselves of the duty of allegiance to the country of their nativity. The statutes
giving to the children of natural born subjects the rights of English natural born
subjects, though born in a foreign country, are statutes of naturalization, giving
certain privileges without the volition of the subject, and without the condition of
residence. If they determine imperatively the status of the natives of other
countries, they conflict with the doctrine of natural allegiance, and also with the
rights of the citizens of other States, and with the sovereignty of other governments.

father of Mary Jay Dawson, a minor,
was a native of England, whence, at the age of sixteen years, he
came with his father to this country to reside. He subsequently
renounced his allegiance to the crown of Great Britain, and became
a naturalized citizen of the United States. His residence was in
the city of New York, from anterior to his marriage until his decease,
in 1852. The mother of the infant was a native of the United
States, and a resident of this city, where she died in 1846. The
minor was born in New York, in the year 1842, and inherited from
her mother a large estate situated in this place.
THE SURROGATE.-The
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In.June, 1852, I appointed Miss Mary Ann Dawson, a paternal
aunt, guardian of the infant, after objections made on the part of
some of the maternal relatives had been withdrawn, upon the consent of the guardian being given that her ward should continue to
reside in the United States. Miss Dawson having subsequently
retracted that consent, and expressed her desire to renounce her
guardianship, her letters were superseded in October, 1852, and
Miss Eliza C. Jay was appointed in her stead. Her ward being
concealed, Miss Jay thereupon instituted a suit in the Supreme
Court, and procured an injunction to restrain the removal of the
minor from the State. The service of this process was avoided
until the infant was clandestinely taken to England. Miss Jay
proceeded to that country, and set on foot proceedings for the purpose of procuring the custody of her ward, in which she was not
only unsuccessful, but was ordered by the Court of Chancery to
transmit the income of the minor's property to England, to be disposed of under the direction of that court. The present application is made to me for instructions in respect to a compliance with
the order of the Lord Chancellor, and also for an allowance of the
expenses incurred in the attempt to recover the custody of the minor.
Some remarks which fell from Sir John Stuart, the Yice-Chancellor, in respect to the jurisdiction of the Surrogate's Court, render
it necessary to correct a mistake as to the powers of this court.
And first, as to the appointment of guardians: the Surrogate, in
respect to all minors residing in his county, has the same extent of
authority as the late Court of Chancery, and that court possessed
the same power as the English Court of Chancery. 2 R. S.173.
It is true, the statute directs such notice of the application to be
given to the relatives residing in the county as the Surrogate "shall
on due inquiry think reasonable," and "on such relatives only as
the Surrogate shall direct;" but there is nothing in the world to
exclude the Surrogate from making the broadest inquiries possible,
and directing notice to parties likely to feel interested in the welfare.
of the minor, whether residing in the county or State, or even in a,
foreign country. In this respect, his course of procedure is just as.
undefined by statute, and just as discretionary as that of the Court
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of Chancery; and once having obtained cognizance of the subject
matter by the residence of the minor, and an application for guardianship, his jurisdiction is just as broad as that of the Court of
Chancery. In making the appointment, his power and discretion
are entirely unlimited, except by such known and established principles as govern the conscience of all courts of equity. It is quite
an error to suppose that relatives in another county or State are
"beyond the view of the Surrogate." There is nothing in the way
of their appointment, if they are proper persons, and give the requisite security. There is not a word in the statute to sanction such
an idea, and everyday practice throughout the State witnesses
against it.
It is a great mistake, also, to suppose that the consent of relatives
residing in the county, or indeed of any relatives, is requisite to the
.appointment of a guardian. The authority of the Surrogate* is
entirely unlimited in this respect. The relatives have no control
in the matter whatever. They have no interest as parties, but
receive notice merely to inform the court, so as to make the best
appointment for the welfare and interests of the child. For example,
in the present case, it was entirely competent for the Surrogate to
have appointed Frederick Dawson or Robert Lee Dawson guardian,
provided he had been satisfied such course was most beneficial for
the infant. The Surrogate also possesses ample power to remove a
guardian. Chancellor Kent held that the Court of Chancery alone
'possessed that jurisdiction (In the matter of Andrews, an Infant,
1 Johns. 99); but that was nearly forty-years ago, and since then the
Revised Statutes have clothed the Surrogate substantially with all
the power the Court of Chancery formerly possessed. 2 R. S.
151, § 6.
Nor are the powers of a guardian appointed by the Surrogate
limited or restricted by locality more than in the case of any other
officer in this State. He is recognized as the lawful guardian
throughout the bounds of the State. Of course he cannot, in a
strict sense, exercise authority out of this State. But that limitation
is not peculiar to a guardian appointed by the Surrogate. In the
very nature of things, it appertains not only to all State officers, but
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also to the courts, which, not possessing extra-territorial jurisdiction,
can give no extra-territorial authority. A guardian appointed by a
Surrogate is no more a local officer than an executor, administrator,
or than a guardian appointed by the Court of Chancery. .Morrell
vs. Dickey, 1 Johns. 156. In his opinion in Miss Jay's case, the
Vice-Chancellor said: "It seems, therefore, that the appointment of
Miss Jay to be guardian by the Surrogate of New York, is so strictly
local, that she could not, according to the American law, exercise
it in the neighboring State of Maryland." That is true, but it does
not depend on the fact that the guardian is appointed by the
Surrogate, for in making the appointment, the Surrogate acts by
authority of the People of the State of New York, and the People
of New York have no authority in the State of Maryland. Except
as connected by the Constitution of the United States, which does
not touch at all the civil, domestic government, New York is as
much a foreign State relatively to Maryland, as England is relatively to France; and a guardian appointed in New York, no matter
by what court, has just as much authority in Maryland, no more,
and no less, as a guardian appointed by the Lord Chancellor of
England would have in France. The ground is the same in each
case-that the laws of one State have no force or effect, Proprio
jure, in another State. There is no reason, therefore, why the
same degree of comity should not be extended to the judicial action
of the Surrogates' Courts in the State of New York, that would be
extended to any other tribunal of a foreign country in the exercise
of its legitimate jurisdiction. The court acts by authority of the
People of this State, its jurisdiction is commensurate with that of
the late Court of Chancery in the appointment and removal of
guardians of minors resident in the county, and its acts are of
recogniied authority within the limits of the State. What attention
is paid to its judicial action beyond the limits of the State, depends
entirely, whether in Maryland, France or England, upon the degree
of regard had to the comity of nations. "It is established as a
'principle of international jurisprudence," says Burge, "that effect
should be given to the laws of another State whenever the rights of
a litigant before its tribunals are derived from or are dependent on
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those laws, and when such recognition is not prejudicial to its own
interests, or the rights of its own subjects." 1 Burge Com. 5. It
may also be safely laid down, that from comity and considerations
of mutual interest, foreign States recognize and give effect almost
universally to those laws of the domicil which constitute the status,
quality or capacity of the person, and which place minors under the
authority of guardians and tutors, respect being had in this particular to the sentence of the appropriate tribunal in the place of
domicil. lb. 14, 25.
In the present case, there can be no doubt that the domicil of the
minor was and is in the city of New York. The place of birth, or
the domicil of the father, regulates the domicil of the child. Mary
Jay Dawson was born in this city, and her father resided here at
the time of her birth, and thence till his decease. This, then, was
her domicil of origin. The domicil of origin can be changed only
by choice, and the domicil of choice being that which the person
himself establishes, it cannot be acquired by the act of the minor,
or by any other person save the father, or the mother being a
widow, and not having married again. Serimshire vs. Berivishire,
2 Hagg. Consist., 406. The domicil of the minor, therefore, had
not been changed at the time the case was brought before the Court
of Chancery in England. Whether a guardian can change the
residence of his ward is not now under consideration. But again,
the minor was a native citizen of the United States. By the Common Law she was an alien in England. Says Lord Coke: "Alien,
alienigena, is derived from the Latin word alienus, and according
to the etymology of the word, it signifieth one born in a strange
country, under the obedience of a strange prince or country, (and
therefore, Bracton saith that this exception propter defectum nationis, should rather be propter defectum subjectionis), or as Littleton saith, (which is the surest), out of the liegeance of the king."
Co. Litt. 128, b ; 1 Bacon Ab., 193, tit. Alien; 1 Com. Dig. 552,
Alien ; Calvin's Case, 7 Rep. 16 a; Duroure vs. Jones, 4 Term
R. 300; Stanley vs. Bernes, 3 Hlagg. 873. "When I say," says
Blackstone, "that an alien is one who is born out of the king's
dominions, or allegiance, this also must be understood with some
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restrictions. The common law indeed stood absolutely so, with
only a very few exceptions, so that a particular act of Parliament
became necessary after the Restoration, ' for the naturalization of
children of his Majesty's English subjects, born in foreign countries during the late troubles." And this maxim of the law proceeded upon a general principle, that every man owes natural
allegiance where he is born, and cannot owe two such allegiances,
or serve two masters at once." 1 Com. 373. Now it is the doctrine of the English law, that natural born subjects cannot divest
themselves of the duty of allegiance which they by natural law owe
to the country of their nativity-that this duty is "intrinsic and
perpetual." If this duty cannot be divested by the act of a person
who has attained full age, much less can it be by a minor, or by
persons who have nnlawfully obtained the custody of a minor, and
taken her from her native country in defiance of the action of its
tribunals of justice. It may be said that by the statutes of 7 Anne,
ch. 5, § 3, and 4 Geo. II., ch. 21, which gave to the children of
natural born subjects the rights of an English natural born subject,
Mary Jay Dawson is an English subject. But those were enabling
statutes-extending privileges, and not establishing coercively a
national character. Their phraseology is the same as that of various
naturalization acts, which generally declare that the persons "shall
be deemed, adjudged, and taken to be natural born subjects of this
kingdom, to all intents, constructions and purposes whatever."
13 Geo. II., c. 7; 20 Geo. II., c. 44; 22 Geo. II., e. 45; 13 Geo.
II., c. 25. The statutes of Anne. and Geo. If. differ only from
other naturalization acts in respect to the condition on which the
privilege is granted. 4 Geo. II., c. 21. They are peculiar in attaching the character of British subjects to the native born citizens
of other States, without the volition of the subject, and without
requiring the condition of residence. If they are to be construed
as imperatively determining the status of the natives of other countries, coming within their provisions, they conflict-with the doctrine
of natural allegiance, which, according to the Common Law, "cannot be forfeited, cancelled, or altered by any change of time, place,
or circumstance." 1 Blackstone Com. 369, 370. Thus, while it is
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held that a native of England cannot be expatriated even by his
own act, a native of the United States, if found in England, would
be claimed as a British subject by virtue of these statutes of naturalization. This is, in other words, the assertion of the right of
sovereignty over citizens of the United States born here of an
English father, a right which has its inception at the instant of
birth, though incapable of exercise unless accident or circumstance
place the subject on British soil. There is thus not only a conflict
with the English doctrine of natural allegiance, but also with the
rights of the American Government-and the local law of England
is made to operate upon a native citizen of the United States,
simply because he may have placed himself within its power by
touching English soil.
It certainly does not increase the strength of this claim, that the
ward of Miss Jay was removed from the country of her birth clandestinely, and in defiance of the authority of the courts of justice.
The Lord Chancellor, in his judgment, says: "If I were called
upon now to adjudge on the conduct of Mr. Dawson and Miss
Dawson, as to what they did when they were in America, I should
be very much inclined to say, that I think they did not conduct
themselves with propriety, because I cannot but feel that they,
more or less in a clandestine manner, caused this young lady to be
brought from America over to England." Here, then, was a native
born citizen of the United States, admitted to have been clandestinely taken from her home, from her father's and mother's home,
in defiance of the mandate of the local tribunals, and of the wishes
of her legally constituted guardian-one who, by the rule of the
common law, could not put off her natural allegiance, and who,
being in minority, was incompetent to change her domicil-and
she, being by the laws of England, that is, by a legal fiction created by Act of Parliament, deemed a British subject, by reason of
the nativity of her father, is retained in that country by the sanction of the Court of Chancery, while the guardian appointed by
the American 'tribunal is directed to transmit the income, to be
appropriated under the direction of the foreign court. Sir John
Stuart, the Vice-Chancellor before whom this case was first brought,
approved of a scheme reported by the clerk, to the effect that it

